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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
lower New York courts. Among these are Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane
& Bernbach, Inc., in which the Appellate Division, Second Depart-
ment, expressly recognized a theory of recovery based upon the
existence of a right of publicity, a right independent of the tradi-
tional right of privacy embodied in sections 50 and 51 of the Civil
Rights Law. Another decision of that same court, Carter v. Carter,
also is analyzed. The Carter court held that child support is no
longer to be considered the primary obligation of the father but
rather a responsibility of both parents to the extent of their financial
ability. It is hoped that The Survey's discussion of these and other
developments will serve to aid the practitioner in keeping abreast
of the major trends in New York practice.
ARTICLE 2-LIMITATIONS OF TIME
CPLR 213(2): Guarantee of contract involving sale of goods
governed by 6-year statute of limitations.
While actions on contracts which involve the sale of goods are
restricted by the 4-year statute of limitations set forth in article 2
of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC),' suits to enforce other
types of contractual obligations are governed by the 6-year limita-
tions period contained in CPLR 213(2) .2 Recently, in American
Trading Co. v. Fish,3 the Court of Appeals held that the guarantee
of a party's performance of a contract for the sale of goods was an
undertaking separate and distinct from the underlying sales agree-
ment and therefore was controlled by the CPLR's 6-year provision.4
In American Trading, plaintiff entered into a contract with
Kinematix, Inc. and defendant Fish, Kinematix's sole shareholder,
providing for the opening of a new branch of plaintiffs business at
the Kinematix office. The agreement required Kinematix to buy all
of its business materials from plaintiff at a certain price and issue
trade acceptances and bills of exchange to plaintiff.5 Pursuant to the
, N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-725(1) (McKinney 1964).
2 Article 2 of the CPLR sets out the various limitations periods within which a New York
litigant must commence a given action "unless a different time is prescribed by law or a
shorter time is prescribed by written agreement." CPLR 201.
42 N.Y.2d 20, 364 N.E.2d 1309, 396 N.Y.S.2d 617 (1977), rev'g 50 App. Div. 2d 764,
376 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (1st Dep't 1975), aff'g mem. 78 Misc. 2d 210, 357 N.Y.S.2d 337 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1974).
42 N.Y.2d at 26-27, 364 N.E.2d at 1312-13, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 620.
Id. at 23, 364 N.E.2d at 1310, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 617-18. In Atterbury v. Bank of Wash.
Heights, 241 N.Y. 231, 149 N.E. 841 (1925), the Court defined trade acceptance as a "'draft
or bill of exchange drawn by the seller on the purchaser of goods sold, and accepted by such
purchaser.' Id. at 239, 149 N.E. at 843 (quoting FED. REs. BD. REGS., ACcEPTANCES § A,
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terms and conditions of the contract, Fish was designated the sole
employee and branch manager of the franchise and he uncondition-
ally guaranteed Kinematix's performance of its contractual obliga-
tions. All of the trade acceptances executed by Kinematix in fur-
therance of the contract subsequently were dishonored. Timely
judgments obtained by plaintiff against Kinematix were uncollecti-
ble due to insolvency.' Thereafter, plaintiff instituted the present
action against Fish as guarantor of Kinematix's performance. As a
consequence of plaintiff's alleged difficulty in serving Fish,7 how-
ever, this suit was delayed until 41/2 years after the date of the last
trade acceptance. Upholding defendant's motion to dismiss, the
Supreme Court, New York County, ruled that the basis of the guar-
antee action was a contract for the sale of goods and that the suit
was thus time barred by the UCC's 4-year limitations period.8 The
appellate division affirmed and plaintiff appealed.
V(a)). See Dubler v. Toscana Straw Goods Corp., 142 Misc. 369, 370, 254 N.Y.S. 464, 466
(N.Y.C. City Ct. N.Y. County 1932).
1 42 N.Y.2d at 23, 364 N.E.2d at 1310, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 618. Even where the principal
debtor is discharged by a bankruptcy court, the guarantor's obligation remains unaffected.
See, e.g., Union Trust Co. v. Willsea, 275 N.Y. 164, 9 N.E.2d 820 (1937) (acceptance of stock
as settlement directed by bankruptcy court and guarantor's participation in the proceeding
does not relieve guarantor of liability); First Nat'l City Bank v. Cooper, 50 App. Div. 2d 518,
375 N.Y.S.2d 118 (1st Dep't 1975) (mem.) (guarantor of 11 demand notes issued to finance
purchase of goods of bankrupt corporation liable for debt not satisfied by bankrupt's assets
notwithstanding alleged oral agreement with creditor not to enforce notes); Chemical Bank
N.Y. Trust Co. v. Amory, 27 App. Div. 2d 730, 277 N.Y.S.2d 459 (1st Dep't 1967) (mem.)
aff'd mem., 21 N.Y.2d 832, 235 N.E.2d 918, 288 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1968) (recovery of maker's
payment on note as preferential payment by his trustee in bankruptcy does not relieve
guarantor of liability). See also Eizenstat & Hull, Bankruptcy of Principal: Reclamation and
Other Common Bankruptcy Problems Facing the Principal and its Surety, 12 FORUM 200
(1976).
' 42 N.Y.2d at 23, 364 N.E.2d at 1310, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 618. Responding to defendant's
statute of limitations defense, plaintiff contended that whereas it had taken 6 extra months
to locate Fish since the latter was residing in Illinois, the limitations period should have been
tolled pursuant to CPLR 207. CPLR 207(3), however, provides that there is no tolling of the
statute when in personam jurisdiction over a defendant may be procured without resort to
personal service within the state. Since the guarantor had consented in the contract to
jurisdiction in New York and there had been no fraud or concealment involved, the trial court
held that the statute had not ceased to run. 78 Misc. 2d at 212-13, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 340. See
Yarusso y. Arbotowicz, 41 N.Y.2d 516, 362 N.E.2d 600, 393 N.Y.S.2d 968 (1977); Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Holbert, 39 Misc. 2d 782, 785, 241 N.Y.S.2d 589, 593 (Sup. Ct. Broome
County 1962), aff'd mem., 19 App. Div. 2d 683, 241 N.Y.S.2d 1021 (3d Dep't 1963). In addition
to this consensual predicate for the exercise of in personam jurisdiction, it should be noted
that pursuant to CPLR 302(a)(1) defendant was subject to jurisdiction for causes of action
arising from the contract which was negotiated and entered into within New York's bounda-
ries. The negotiation and execution of a contract in New York have been held to constitute
sufficiently purposeful activity to satisfy the nexus requirements of long-arm jurisdiction.
See, e.g., American Eutectic Welding Alloys Sales Co. v. Dytron Alloys Corp., 439 F.2d 428,
431-32 (2d Cir. 1971); Karlin v. Avis, 326 F. Supp. 1325, 1328 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); George Reiner
& Co. v. Schwartz, 41 N.Y.2d 648, 363 N.E.2d 551, 394 N.Y.S.2d 844 (1977).
78 Misc. 2d at 211-12, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 339-40.
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The Court of Appeals, while acknowledging that a narrow con-
struction of the tripartite agreement might suggest the existence of
nothing more than an ordinary sales contract,"5 held that the agree-
ment in fact embodied separate undertakings, each of which should
be subject to different limitations periods." Defendant Fish, the
Court reasoned, was liable upon a contract of guarantee rather than
one of coobligation since his undertakings differed from those as-
sumed by Kinematix. 12 In particular, the Court noted that the con-
tract "did not grant defendant [Fish] the right to enforce the sales
aspect of the agreement against [plaintiff] American. 1' 3 Accord-
ingly, defendant could not be characterized as a beneficiary of the
4-year statute of limitations which controlled actions instituted
upon the sales contract. 4 Rather, Judge Cooke, writing for a unani-
mous panel, held that the suit against Fish should be governed by
the 6-year limitations period applicable to contract actions. Thus,
the Court rejected the notion that the liability of a guarantor neces-
sarily must be coextensive with that of the primary obligor, 15 and
50 App. Div. 2d at 764, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 1014.
10 42 N.Y.2d at 24, 364 N.E.2d at 1311, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 618.
II d.
" Id. Fish had argued that his obligation was coextensive with that of the corporation
and that it would be incongruous, therefore, to apply a different limitations period to the
guarantee provision. Id. at 23-24, 364 N.E.2d at 1310-11, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 618.
'1 Id. at 24, 364 N.E.2d at 1311, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 619.
14 Id.
Is Id. at 26-27, 364 N.E.2d at 1312, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 619-20. A guarantee is a secondary
obligation, General Phoenix Corp. v. Cabot, 300 N.Y. 87, 89 N.E.2d 238 (1949), and the
guarantor is under no duty to perform until the principal debtor has defaulted, L. SIMPSON,
THE LAW OF SURETYSHIP § 3 (1950). The guarantor's obligation is conditioned expressly upon
the principal debtor's breach. The guarantor is not in privity with the debtor with respect to
the principal obligation and the debtor is not a party to the guarantee. Id. § 6; see Draper v.
Snow, 20 N.Y. 331 (1854); Kings County Say. Bank v. Fulton Say. Bank, 268 App. Div. 452,
454, 52 N.Y.S.2d 47, 49 (2d Dep't 1944) (per curiam); Pink v. Investors' Syndicate Title &
Guar. Co., 246 App. Div. 172, 175, 285 N.Y.S. 155, 159 (3d Dep't), aff'd mem., 273 N.Y. 483,
6 N.E.2d 414 (1936). Therefore, the duty of the guarantor does not arise until after the last
day for the debtor's performance has passed. L. SIMPSON, THE LAW OF SURETYSHIP § 14 (1950);
see, e.g., Galloway v. Barnesville Loan, Inc., 74 Ohio App. 23, 57 N.E.2d 337 (1943). The
guarantor then becomes absolutely liable when notified of his principal's default. See gener-
ally RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 82 (1941).
Since a guarantee is a collateral contract by definition, separate and distinct from the
contract which it insures, there appears to be little reason why it cannot differ from the main
contract with respect to the obligations it imposes upon the guarantor. See, e.g., Evansville
Nat'l Bank v. Kaufmann, 93 N.Y. 273 (1883); Standard Brands, Inc. v. Straile, 23 App. Div.
2d 363, 260 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1st Dep't 1965) (per curiam); Marburt Holding Corp. v. Picto
Corp., 5 App. Div. 2d 617, 173 N.Y.S.2d 762 (1st Dep't 1958); Cross v. Rosenbaum, 7 Misc.
2d 309, 161 N.Y.S.2d 337 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1957). Yet, in reaching its decision that
the liability of a guarantor need not be coextensive with that of the principal, the American
Trading Court felt compelled to distinguish Cheesman v. Cheesman, 236 N.Y. 47, 139 N.E.
775 (1923). The Cheesman opinion stated:
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focused upon the nature of the underlying obligations assumed
within the agreement. Since the UCC neither expressly nor im-
pliedly superseded the CPLR's applicability to guarantees,'" the
Court had little difficulty in reversing the lower court's decision and
applying the 6-year limitations period.'7 As an alternative ground
for its holding, the Court noted that the 6-year statute of limitations
for suits on trade acceptances was applicable to the action, since
Fish's guarantee covered trade acceptances executed and issued by
Kinematix pursuant to the original sales contract.'8
It is the general rule that a surety is not liable if the original debt is barred by the
Statute of Limitations. In such a case no recovery may be had even where the
principal has allowed judgment to be taken against him. The surety may avail itself
of the statute in an action brought against it.
Id. at 51, 139 N.E. at 776 (citing Dawes v. Shed, 15 Mass. 6 (1818) and McMullen v. Rafferty,
80 N.Y. 456 (1882)). Cheesman involved a claim for Workmen's Compensation by a minor
employed by his father. The claim was not filed, however, until after the 1-year statute of
limitations contained in the Workmen's Compensation Law, ch. 634, § 4, [1918] N.Y. Laws
2020 (current version at N.Y. WORK. COMp. LAW § 28 (McKinney Supp. 1977-1978) (now 2
years)), had expired. The father, the principal obligor, had not objected to this late filing,
but the carrier, who was a surety as to the employee under the Workmen's Compensation
Law, ch. 41, § 10, [19141 N.Y. Laws 222, ch. 622, §§ 2, 6, [19161 N.Y. Laws 2041, 2048, ch.
634, § 3, [1918] N.Y. Laws 2018 (current version at N.Y. WORK. COMP. LAw 99 10, 11, 13,
26 (McKinney 1965 & Supp. 1977-1978)), had raised the statute of limitations defense. The
Court held that the insurer could successfully invoke the 1-year statute of limitations defense,
even though the principal had chosen to waive it. No discussion of whether the general statute
of limitations as opposed to the Workmen's Compensation statute of limitations should apply
was undertaken, as a reading of the Workmen's Compensation statute of limitations demon-
strated the legislature's intent that it apply to the carrier:
"The right to claim compensation . . . shall be forever barred unless within one
year after the accident . . . a claim for compensation thereunder shall be filed...
but the employer and insurance carrier shall be deemed to have waived the bar of
the statute unless the objection of the failure to file the claim . . . is raised before
the Commission on the hearing."
236 N.Y. at 50, 139 N.E. at 776 (quoting Workmen's Compensation Law § 28, ch. 634, § 4,
[1916] N.Y. Laws 2020 (current version at N.Y. WORK. COMp. LAW § 28 (McKinney Supp.
1977-1978)) (emphasis added). No such clear legislative intent to apply a 4-year limitations
period to guarantees of sales contracts is present in the UCC. The American Trading Court
found, therefore, that the Cheesman language should not be construed as authorizing the
automatic release of a guarantor upon the running of the statute of limitations in favor of
the principal.
" 42 N.Y.2d at 27, 364 N.E.2d at 1313, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 620.
17 Id.
11 Id. at 27-28, 364 N.E.2d at 1313, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 620. Trade acceptances, being
negotiable instruments within the meaning of N.Y.U.C.C. § 3-104(2) (McKinney 1964), Na-
tional Bank of North America v. Beinhorn, 10 UCC Rep. Serv. 847 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nassau
County 1972); see Merson v. Sun Ins. Co., 44 Misc. 2d 131, 132, 253 N.Y.S.2d 51, 52 (N.Y.C.
Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1964) (citing Citizens Trust Co. v. R. Prescott & Sons, Inc., 221 App.
Div. 420, 422, 223 N.Y.S. 184, 187 (4th Dep't 1927)), are governed by the 6-year statute of
limitations set forth in CPLR 213(2). See Seligson v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 50 App. Div.
2d 206, 376 N.Y.S.2d 899 (1st Dep't 1975) (certified check); Richman v. Kauffman, 48 App.
Div. 2d 988, 369 N.Y.S.2d 565 (3d Dep't 1975) (mem.) (promissory note).
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It is suggested that the defense of the underlying UCC statute
of limitations in the American Trading situation is akin to a per-
sonal defense which bars relief against the principal obligor but
which does not affect the guarantor's liability."5 Under this view, the
Court's ruling that the guarantee of a sales contract, like that ac-
companying any other contract, is governed by the CPLR's 6-year
limitations period seems just and logical. The holding is consonant
with decisions in most other jurisdictions 0 and therefore promotes
the consistent procedural application of the UCC.21
ARTICLE 3-JURISDICTION AND SERVICE, APPEARANCE AND CHOICE OF
COURT
CPLR 308(2): Delivery of summons and complaint to doorman in
apartment house lobby deemed valid service upon apartment
dweller in certain circumstances.
CPLR 308(2) provides that personal service of a summons upon
a natural person may be made "by delivering the summons within
the state to a person of suitable age and discretion at the actual
place of business, dwelling place or usual place of abode of the
person to be served and by mailing the summons to the person to
be served at his last known residence. ' 22 This method of service may
be effected even in the absence of prior attempts to deliver the
summons to the defendant personally. Problems of interpretation
11 See, e.g., Rhodia, Inc. v. Steel, 32 App.Div. 2d 753, 300 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (1st Dep't 1969)
(mem.) (defense based on defects in merchandise sold to principal debtor not available to
guarantor); Ralston Purina Co. v. Siegel's Poultry, Inc., 24 App. Div. 2d 926, 264 N.Y.S.2d
601 (3d Dep't 1965) (mem.) (principal's claim against creditor for negligence in performance
of service provision of sales contract guaranteed, not available to guarantor either as defense
or setoff). See generally Ettlinger v. National Sur. Co., 221 N.Y. 467, 117 N.E. 945 (1917).
20 See, e.g., Weems v. Carter, 30 F.2d 202 (4th Cir. 1929); Bloom v. Bender, 48 Cal. 2d
793, 313 Po2d 568 (1957); Bank of Nev. v. Friedman, 82 Nev. 417, 420 P.2d 1 (1966); Fidelity
& Cas. Co. v. Lackland, 175 Va. 178, 8 S.E.2d 306 (1940). But see First Nat'l Bank v. Drake,
185 Iowa 879, 171 N.W. 115 (1919).
21 Besides promulgating simple and clear rules to govern modern commercial transac-
tions without restricting ongoing expansion through custom, usage, and agreement as to
commercial practices, the aim of the UCC is "to make uniform the law among the various
jurisdictions." N.Y.U.C.C. § 1-102(2) (McKinney 1964).
12 Under CPLR 308(2) service may be made
by delivering the summons within the state to a person of suitable age and discre-
tion at the actual place of business, dwelling place or usual place of abode of the
person to be served and by mailing the summons to the person to be served at his
last known residence; proof of such service shall be filed within twenty days there-
after with the clerk of the court designated in the summons; service shall be com-
plete ten days after such filing; proof of service shall identify such person of suitable
age and discretion and state the date, time and place of service . ..
